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Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is a landmark federal law 
which prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, 
religion, sex or national origin.1  In three momentous cases, argued 
before the United States Supreme Court in the October 2019 term, the 
Court will decide whether Title VII’s prohibition of discrimination 
“because of sex” necessarily includes a prohibition of discrimination 
based on sexual orientation as well as a prohibition of discrimination 
based on gender identity or transgender status.2  The Supreme Court 
granted petitions for writ of certiorari in Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 
Bostock v. Clayton County Board of Commissioners, and EEOC v. R.G. 
& G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc.3  All three cases involve the statutory 
interpretation of Title VII’s prohibition of employment discrimination 
 
1. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2020). 
2. See Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 855 F.3d 76 (2nd Cir. 2001), rev’d en banc, 883 F.3d 
100 (2d Cir. 2018) (en banc), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019) (examining the parameters of 
Title VII when an employee revealed his sexual orientation to a customer and was subsequently 
fired); see also Bostock v. Clayton Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 723 F. App’x 964 (11th Cir. 2018), (en 
banc), 894 F.3d 1335 (2018), cert. granted, 2019 U.S. LEXIS 2927 (U.S. Apr. 22, 2019) (discussing 
whether an employee’s termination was lawful when the reasons for termination included his sexual 
orientation); EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d 560 (6th Cir. 2018), cert. 
granted, 2019 U.S. LEXIS 2846 (U.S. Apr. 22, 2019) (evaluating the lawfulness of a funeral 
home’s actions when it fired a woman after she informed the funeral home that she was a 
transgender woman).   
3. 883 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2018), 139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019); see 723 F. App’x at 964 (holding 
that binding precedent foreclosed a Title VII action based on sexual orientation discrimination); 
see also 884 F.3d at 560 (holding that discrimination on the basis of transgender status is necessarily 
discrimination because of sex under Title VII). 
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against any individual “because of such individual’s . . . sex.”4  This 
article will briefly highlight some of the important decisions holding that 
Title VII’s prohibition of sex discrimination encompasses discrimination 
based on gender identity and sexual orientation.  As an attorney who 
worked closely on these issues for the last fifteen or more years and 
attended the Supreme Court oral arguments for the three cases on October 
8, 2019, I will also offer my personal observations and perspectives about 
these issues.  The views expressed in this article are my personal views 
and not that of my employer. 
I.    SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT CLARIFIES THE RELEVANCE 
OF GENDER STEREOTYPING UNDER TITLE VII 
Gender stereotyping refers generally to beliefs, perceptions, or 
expectations about the role, appearance, and behavior of men and 
women.5  The existence of conduct based on gender stereotypes can 
provide proof that an employment decision or abusive environment is 
motivated by a sex-based factor and in violation of Title VII.6  For 
example, gender stereotyping provides evidence to prove sex 
discrimination when an employer denies a promotion to a woman because 
she walks like a man, talks in a deep voice, does not wear make-up, 
jewelry, or a traditionally feminine haircut.7  If the employer considers 
such “masculine mannerisms and traits” in an adverse employment 
decision, the employer has taken gender into account in making an 
employment decision.8 
 
4. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2020). 
5. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 256 (1989) (discussing that the Policy 
Board in making its decision did in fact take into consideration comments from partners that were 
solely motivated by stereotypical notions about women’s proper deportment). 
6. See generally id. (“Price Waterhouse also charges that Hopkins produced no evidence 
that sex stereotyping played a role in the decision to place her candidacy on hold. As we have 
stressed, however, Hopkins showed that the partnership solicited evaluations from all of the firm’s 
partners . . . including the comments that were motivated by stereotypical notions about women’s 
proper deportment.”). 
7. See id. (“[Sex stereotyping does not] require expertise in psychology to know that, if an 
employee’s flawed “interpersonal skills” can be corrected by a soft-hued suit or a new shade of 
lipstick, perhaps it is the employee’s sex and not her interpersonal skills that has drawn the 
criticism.”). 
8. See id. at 239 (evaluating on the many factors that go into an employer’s administrative 
decisions relating to employees). 
3
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Gender stereotyping also may prove a sex-based hostile work 
environment; for example, an effeminate male repeatedly insulted by co-
workers as “she” and “her,” or “faggot” and “female whore” has a 
legitimate hostile work environment claim.9  Such harassment occurs 
“because of sex” in that the employee is harassed because he is a man 
who, in the view of the harassers, looks and acts effeminately.10  Gender 
has been taken into account in subjecting the employee to a hostile work 
environment.11 
In a 1978 Title VII case, City of Los Angeles v. Manhart, the Supreme 
Court made the following pronouncement: 
It is now well recognized that employment decisions cannot be predicated 
on mere ‘stereotyped’ impressions about the characteristics of males or 
females . . . .  ‘In forbidding employers to discriminate against individuals 
because of their sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire  
spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex 
stereotypes . . . .’  Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc.12  Myths and purely 
habitual assumptions about [men or women] . . . are no longer acceptable 
reasons for refusing to employ qualified individuals, or for paying them 
less . . . .  Even a true generalization about the [protected] class is an 
insufficient reason for disqualifying an individual to whom the 
generalization does not apply.13 
Later, in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the Supreme Court expounded 
on the legal relevance of such “sex stereotyping,” and how conduct based 
on sex stereotyping is considered evidence of sex discrimination under 
Title VII: 
In the specific context of sex stereotyping, an employer who acts on the 
basis of a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive, or that she must not 
be, has acted on the basis of gender . . . .  [W]e are beyond the day when 
 
9. See Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enter. Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001) (describing the 
systemic abuse suffered by an individual who did not conform to his co-workers’ stereotyped 
expectations of masculinity). 
10. See id. (portraying a situation where there was harassment “because of sex”); see also 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2020) (outlining unlawful employment practices 
regarding sex discrimination). 
11. See id. at 871 (holding “it is … now clear that sexual harassment in the form of a hostile 
work environment constitutes sex discrimination”). 
12. City of Los Angeles v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707–08 (1978) (citing Sprogis v. United 
Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971)). 
13. Id. 
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an employer could evaluate employees by insisting that they matched the 
stereotype associated with their group . . . .14 
In that case, a female employee named Ann Hopkins, was denied 
partnership at an accounting firm based, in part, on the evaluative 
comments submitted by several partners to the “Policy Board.”15  These 
partners’ comments, according to the Supreme Court, “overtly referred to 
her failure to conform to certain gender stereotypes as a factor militating 
against her election to partnership.”16  For example, “[o]ne partner 
described her as ‘macho . . . [another] advised her to take ‘a course at 
charm school.’”17  Moreover, in what the Supreme Court called the coup 
de grace, the partner, who explained to Ms. Hopkins the reasons for 
denying her partnership, advised her to “walk more femininely, talk more 
femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, 
and wear jewelry.”18 
On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the trial court had clearly erred 
in finding insufficient evidence of sex stereotyping, and that sex 
stereotyping had played a part in the partnership decision.19  First, the 
Court emphasized that the expert testimony presented on behalf of 
Hopkins regarding sex stereotyping “was merely icing on Hopkins’ 
cake,” because the partners’ comments obviously constituted 
“stereotypical notions about women’s proper deportment.”20  According 
to the Court, “[i]t takes no [expert] to discern sex stereotyping in a 
description of an aggressive female employee as requiring ‘a course at 
charm school.’”21  Second, the Court concluded Price Waterhouse 
undoubtedly took these comments into account in deciding to put 
Hopkins’ partnership on hold—as it had solicited and relied on its 
partners’ evaluations and did not disclaim reliance on the sex stereotyping 
comments.22  According to the Court, Price Waterhouse was liable for 
 
14. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251. 
15. Id.   
16. Id. at 273 (O’Connor, S., concurring). 
17. Id. at 235. 
18. Id. 
19. Id. at 237–38. 
20. See id. at 256 (elaborating on Hopkins’ testimony and why she interpreted the partner’s 
written comments evaluating her candidacy for partnership as sex stereotyping). 
21. Id. 
22. Id. at 251, 257. 
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sex discrimination based on sex stereotyping, thus, in violation of Title 
VII.23 
II.    TITLE VII DOES NOT EXCLUDE GENDER STEREOTYPING 
DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS WHERE THE FACTS SHOW 
TRANSGENDER DISCRIMINATION 
Smith v. City of Salem is an important Sixth Circuit decision, applying 
Title VII to factual circumstances which plainly showed discrimination 
based on transgender status.24  In Smith, a transgender firefighter, Jimmie 
Smith, contended that the employer had engaged in discrimination based 
on sex in violation of Title VII, “because of . . . gender non-conforming 
conduct and, more generally because of . . . identification as a 
transsexual.”25  Because Smith failed to state a claim of sex stereotyping 
under Price Waterhouse based on transsexuality, the district court held 
that Smith was excluded from Title VII’s protection.26  The Sixth Circuit 
Court of Appeals reversed and specifically disapproved of the district 
court’s implication that Smith had disingenuously invoked the sex 
stereotyping term-of-art to run around the “real” claim, which was based 
on transgender status.27 
The Sixth Circuit held that Smith’s complaint sufficiently pled the 
gender stereotyping claim by alleging (1) that co-workers began 
commenting on her appearance, expressing a more feminine manner due 
to being a transgender woman and (2) that her employer schemed to force 
her resignation.28 
It follows [from Price Waterhouse] that employers who discriminate 
against men because they do wear dresses and makeup, or otherwise act 
femininely, are also engaging in sex discrimination, because the 
discrimination would not occur but for the victim’s sex.29 
 
23. Id. at 258. 
24. See 378 F.3d 566, 568, 571 (6th Cir. 2004) (describing the application of Title VII when 
a trans woman lieutenant was suspended because of her gender non-conforming behavior). 
25. Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 568, 571 (6th Cir. 2004). 
26. Id. at 569. 
27. Id. at 571, 575, 578. 
28. Id. at 572. 
29. Id. at 574. 
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In sustaining Smith’s gender stereotyping claim, the court made clear 
that Smith’s transgender status did not exclude Smith from Title VII 
coverage: 
[D]iscrimination against a plaintiff who is a transsexual–and therefore fails 
to act like and/or identify with the gender norms associated with his or her 
sex–is no different from the discrimination directed against Ann Hopkins 
in Price Waterhouse, who, in sex-stereotypical terms, did not act like a 
woman.  Sex stereotyping based on a person’s gender non-conforming 
behavior is impermissible discrimination, irrespective of the cause of that 
behavior; a label, such as “transsexual,” is not fatal to a sex discrimination 
claim where the victim has suffered discrimination because of his or her 
gender non-conformity.30 
Similar to the Sixth Circuit’s application of Price Waterhouse to Smith, 
three other circuit courts of appeals have held that acts of discrimination 
on the basis of sex include discrimination based on gender identity.31 
III.    DISCRIMINATION BECAUSE OF TRANSGENDER STATUS IS ITSELF 
NECESSARILY DISCRIMINATION BECAUSE OF SEX—AIMEE STEPHENS 
In EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., the Sixth Circuit 
held that sex discrimination under Title VII included discrimination of 
transgender persons based on their transgender or transitioning status.32  
In this case, Aimee Stephens, a transgender funeral director, was 
terminated from her employment by Thomas Rost, a funeral home’s 
owner.33  Shortly before being fired, Stephens informed Rost that, due to 
her transition from male to female, she should represent and dress as a 
 
30. Id. at 575. 
31. See Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1317 (11th Cir. 2018) (“Discrimination against a 
transgender individual because of [their] gender-nonconformity is sex discrimination, whether it’s 
described as being on the basis of sex or gender.”); see also Rosa v. Park W. Bank & Tr. Co., 214 
F.3d 213, 215–16 (1st Cir. 2000) (stating that disparate treatment between a man dressed as a 
woman and a traditionally-dressed woman would fall into a prohibited category); Schwenk v. 
Hartford, 203 F.3d 1187, 1202 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Under Price Waterhouse, ‘sex’ under Title VII 
encompasses both sex—that is, the biological differences between men and women—and gender. 
Discrimination because one fails to act in the way expected of a man or woman is forbidden under 
Title VII.”) (citing Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250). 
32. 884 F.3d at 600 (“Discrimination against employees, either because of their failure to 
conform to sex stereotypes or their transgender and transitioning status, is illegal under Title VII.”). 
33. Id. at 566. 
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woman in appropriate business attire while at work.34  Rost admitted that 
he fired Stephens because she was no longer representing as a man and 
he wanted her to dress traditionally feminine.35  The United States Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) sued the funeral home 
alleging, among other things, that the funeral home violated Title VII by 
terminating Stephens based on her transgender or transitioning status and 
her refusal to conform to the owner’s sex-based stereotypes.36 
By denying the funeral home’s Motion for Failure to State a Claim, the 
district court determined that Stephens adequately stated a Title VII claim 
due to her termination because of her failure to conform to sex-based 
stereotypes.37  Nevertheless, the district court limited the EEOC’s pursuit 
of its unlawful-termination claim, ruling that “transgender status is not a 
protected trait under Title VII, and . . . the EEOC could not sue for 
alleged discrimination . . . based solely on [Stephens’] transgender and/or 
transitioning status.”38  However, the Sixth Circuit held that narrowing 
the claim was erroneous because “[d]iscrimination on the basis of 
transgender and transitioning status is necessarily discrimination on the 
basis of sex” in violation of Title VII.39  Thus, Stephens could indeed 
claim she was discriminated against on the basis of her transgender and 
transitioning status alone.40 
A. The Sex Stereotyping Claim 
In affirming Stephens’ sex stereotyping claim, the Sixth Circuit refuted 
the funeral home’s argument that its sex-specific dress code requiring 
Stephens to abide by the male dress code did not constitute disparate 
treatment in violation of Title VII—as the dress-code equally applied to 
and burdened females.41  The funeral home required women to wear skirt 
suits and men to wear pant suits, and it viewed Stephens as a male who 
was required to abide by the male dress code.42  According to the court, 
 
34. Id. at 569. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. at 570. 
38. Id. at 569–70. 
39. Id. at 571, 574–75. 
40. See id. at 600 (describing the ways in which Stephens was discriminated because of her 
transgender and/or her transitioning status). 
41. Id. at 572–73. 
42. Id. at 568, 573. 
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the question as to whether the funeral home’s sex-specific dress code 
violated Title VII was not the issue before it.43  Rather, the question 
before the court was whether the funeral home violated Title VII by 
terminating Stephens—despite her intent to comply with the company’s 
sex-specific dress code—because she refused to conform to the funeral 
home’s notion of her sex.44 
The Sixth Circuit held that the cases relied upon by the funeral home, 
Barker v. Taft Broadcasting Co. and Jesperson v. Harrah’s Operating 
Co., were incompatible or irreconcilable with Price Waterhouse and 
Smith.45  Barker endorsed the traditional concept of sex, but according 
to the Sixth Circuit, Price Waterhouse eviscerated that traditional concept 
in its recognition that, under Title VII, “[sex] encompasses both the 
biological differences between men and women, and gender 
discrimination, that is, discrimination based on failure to conform to 
stereotypical gender norms.”46 
Jespersen’s holding that Harrah’s grooming standards—requiring only 
female bartenders to wear makeup—directly conflicted with Smith.47  
Smith concluded that requiring women to wear makeup does constitute 
improper sex stereotyping.48  Moreover, the plaintiff in Smith was not 
required to allege that being expected to adopt a more masculine 
appearance and manner interfered with job performance.49 
 
43. See id. (attempting to narrow the issue in a way that excluded the discussion of Title 
VII).   
44. Id. at 573. 
45. Compare 549 F.2d 400, 401–02 (6th Cir. 1977) (describing why the sex-specific 
grooming code allowing women but not men to wear long hair did not violate Title VII), and 444 
F.3d 1104, 1109–11 (9th Cir. 2006) (understanding that no Title VII violation occurred where a 
grooming code imposed different but equally burdensome requirements on males and females), 
with 490 U.S. 228 (finding a Title VII violation where the decision to promote a senior manager 
was refused based on sexual stereotypes of women), and 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that 
allegations that an employee was discriminated against based upon the employee’s gender non-
conforming behavior and appearance were actionable pursuant to Title VII). 
46. Barker v. Taft Broad. Co., 549 F.2d 400, 402 (6th Cir. 1977) (citing Price Waterhouse, 
490 U.S. at 256). 
47. Compare 444 F.3d at 1112 (holding that grooming standards which required women to 
wear makeup did not constitute a sex stereotype), with 378 F.3d at 566 (elaborating on why a 
makeup requirement for women was, in fact, a sex stereotype). 
48. Smith, 378 F.3d at 571. 
49. See id. at 572 (stating that the employee need not indicate that the allegedly 
discriminatory requirement interfered with the employee’s job performance).   
9
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Finally, the Sixth Circuit repudiated the funeral home’s suggested 
reading of Price Waterhouse and Smith, in that sex stereotyping violates 
Title VII only when the employer’s sex stereotyping results in disparate 
treatment of men and women.50  In Smith, the court did not compare the 
difference in treatment between transgender persons transitioning from 
male to female and transgender persons transitioning from female to 
male.51  Indeed, a defense by the employer in Price Waterhouse that it 
fired both a gender non-conforming man and a gender non-conforming 
woman would have failed because two wrongs do not make a right.52  
According to the Sixth Circuit, Price Waterhouse and Smith dictate that 
“an employer engages in unlawful discrimination even if it expects both 
biologically male and female employees to conform to certain notions of 
how each should behave.”53 
B. The Claim Based on Transgender and Transitioning Status 
The Sixth Circuit set forth two reasons for its central holding that 
discrimination on the basis of transgender and transitioning status 
violates Title VII.54  First, the court reasoned that it was impossible to 
discriminate based on an employee’s transgender status “without being 
motivated, at least in part, by the employee’s sex.”55  To illustrate this 
point, the court asked “whether Stephens would have been fired if 
Stephens had been a woman who sought to comply with the women’s 
dress code.”56  The obvious answer in the negative confirmed that 
Stephens’ sex impermissibly motivated her termination.57  The court 
called this “paradigmatic sex discrimination.”58 
 
50. See R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d at 574 (describing the court’s 
resistance in using Price Waterhouse and Smith as limiting discrimination under Title VII). 
51. See id. (describing that no difference was delineated in what sex was being transitioned 
to). 
52. See id. (understanding that a defense as to similar discriminatory treatment will not stand 
against Title VII). 
53. See id. (citing Zarda, 883 F.3d at 123) 
54. Id. at 575–76. 
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Further, the Court analogized discrimination based on religion to 
discrimination based on sex in the workplace.59  In doing so, the Court 
explained that when an employer fires someone on the basis of their 
religion, such an act constitutes discrimination under Title VII regardless 
of an employer’s biases.60  Discrimination on the basis of religion 
inherently encompasses discrimination on the basis of a change in 
religion.61  Using the same logic, it follows that discrimination on the 
basis of a change of sex is inherently included in sex discrimination.62   
According to the Sixth Circuit, “discrimination because of a person’s 
transgender, intersex or sexually indeterminate status, is no less 
actionable than discrimination because of a person’s identification with 
two religions, an unorthodox religion or no religion at all.”63  In Harris 
Funeral Homes, the funeral home argued that the analogy to religion was 
“structurally flawed” because a person’s sex is “a biologically immutable 
trait” which, unlike religion, cannot be changed.64  Therefore, the court 
held this to be an “immaterial” point that it did not need to decide.65  The 
Sixth Circuit reaffirmed Price Waterhouse’s holding that sex should be 
irrelevant to employment decisions and added that an employer’s adverse 
employment decision on the basis of a sex-change directly disobeys Price 
Waterhouse.66 
Second, the court reasoned that discrimination against transgender 
persons “necessarily implicates Title VII’s proscriptions against sex 
stereotyping.”67  As in Smith, the court recognized the American 
Psychiatric Association recognizes transgender status as a disjunction 
between one’s individual’s sexual organs and sexual identity.68  In other 
words, “a transgender person is someone who . . . is inherently ‘gender 
non-conforming.’”69  Because of this, the court concluded that an 
employer’s discrimination because of transgender status always involves 
 
59. Id. at 575–76. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. at 575. 
62. Id. 
63. Id. at 575 n. 4. 
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the employer’s imposition of its stereotypes about the alignment of sexual 
organs and gender identity.70  Thus, the Sixth Circuit held that 
discrimination because of transgender or transitioning status is inherently 
discrimination based on gender non-conformity in violation of Title 
VII.71 
C. The Sixth Circuit Rejects Arguments Against Interpreting Title VII 
to Include Transgender Status Discrimination 
In Harris Funeral Homes, the court specifically rejected several 
arguments raised by the funeral home regarding Title VII’s 
interpretation.72  First, the funeral home argued that Congress, in 
enacting Title VII, understood sex to refer only to physiology and 
reproductive roles—and not to a person’s gender identity.73  The Sixth 
Circuit concluded, however, that Congress’ failure to anticipate that Title 
VII would cover transgender status had little interpretative value.74   
The Supreme Court teaches that “statutory prohibitions often go 
beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable evils and it is 
ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns of 
our legislators by which we are governed.”75  Such “reasonably 
comparable evils” include same sex sexual harassment and hostile work 
environment claims that Title VII now prohibits, but were initially 
believed to fall outside its scope.76  Moreover, according to the Sixth 
Circuit, Price Waterhouse eviscerated the narrow or traditional view of 
sex as referring only to “chromosomally driven physiology and 
reproductive function” by recognizing that “sex” under Title VII refers 
not only to biological differences but also to gender norms.77  Thus, pre-
Price Waterhouse cases holding otherwise were no longer valid.78 
Second, the funeral home argued transgender status was not unique to 




72. Id. at 578. 
73. Id. at 577. 
74. Id. 
75. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998). 
76. Id. at 80–81. 
77. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d at 578–79. 
78. See id. at 578 (explaining why the reasoning in cases decided before Price Waterhouse 
are directly counter to modern law). 
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persons may consider themselves transgender.79  According to the Sixth 
Circuit, however, “[a] trait need not be exclusive to one sex to 
nevertheless be a function of sex.”80  To violate Title VII, an employer 
need not discriminate based on a trait common to all men or all women.81  
Instead, Title VII focuses on whether a particular individual is 
discriminated against because of his or her sex, not on whether a 
particular sex is discriminated against.82  An employer who 
discriminates against an employee based on transgender status is 
necessarily considering that employee’s biological sex, and thus 
discriminating based on sex—this is so no matter what sex the employee 
was born or wishes to be.83 
Finally, later statutes, such as the Violence Against Women Act, which 
expressly prohibits discrimination on the basis of gender identity, were 
of little interpretative value to the Sixth Circuit.84  This is because 
Congress may choose to use a belt and suspenders method to achieve its 
objectives.85 
IV.    MIXED RESULTS: TITLE VII SEX DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS 
WHERE FACTS SHOW DISCRIMINATION BASED ON GENDER 
NON-CONFORMITY DUE TO SEXUAL ORIENTATION 
Before Price Waterhouse’s clarification about the relevance of sex 
stereotyping and the text-focused approach to statutory construction 
applied to Title VII by Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services Inc., two 
federal courts of appeals held that sexual orientation was excluded from 





82. See id. at 574 (citing Zarda, 883 F.3d at 123); Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 
2000e-2(a) (2020). 
83. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d at 578. 
84. Id. 
85. See id. at 575 (quoting Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Indiana, 853 F.3d 339, 344 
(7th Cir. 2017)). 
86. See 490 U.S. at 251 (describing that “[i]n the specific context of sex stereotyping, an 
employer who acts on the basis of a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive, or that she must not 
be, has acted on the basis of gender… .”); see also 523 U.S. 75 (1998) (holding sex discrimination 
consisting of same-sex sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII); Blum v. Gulf Oil Corp., 
597 F.2d 936 (5th Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (holding that even if a prima facie case of sex 
discrimination was presented, the employer had a legitimate reason for discharge which did not 
13
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Corp., the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals summarily addressed the issue 
in one sentence, stating:  “[d]ischarge for homosexuality is not prohibited 
by Title VII . . . .”87  In coming to this conclusion, the court relied on 
Smith v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.88  However, the Smith holding 
directly conflicts with the Price Waterhouse holding.89  Second, in 
DeSantis v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co., Inc., the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals held that Congress had not intended Title VII to apply 
to sexual orientation and only had “traditional notions of ‘sex’ in 
mind.”90  DeSantis, similar to Blum, also cites and relies on Smith.91 
In the decades following Price Waterhouse, courts have grappled with 
Title VII sex discrimination suits where facts show there is discrimination 
based on an employee’s failure to conform to their gender due to being 
gay or lesbian.92  While parroting and mechanically following the view 
that sexual orientation was outside of Title VII’s purview, some courts 
attempted to tease apart evidence of sex stereotyping from evidence of 
sexual orientation discrimination.93  For example, in Prowel v. Wise 
Business Forms, Inc., the Third Circuit Court of Appeals acknowledged 
“the line between sexual orientation discrimination and discrimination 
‘because of sex’ can be difficult to draw.”94  Other courts have applied a 
categorical exclusionary rule—dismissing claims based on gender 
 
involve the employee’s race, sex, or religion); DeSantis v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 333 
(9th Cir. 1979) (holding that homosexuals are not a protected class within the statutory meaning). 
87. See 597 F.2d 936, 938 (5th Cir. 1979) (citing Smith v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 569 F.2d 
325, 327 (5th Cir. 1978)). 
88. See id. (dismissing a Title VII sex discrimination claim by a male who had been 
terminated for being effeminate). 
89. Compare 569 F.2d at 325 (dismissing a Title VII sex discrimination claim by a male 
who had been terminated for being effeminate), with 490 U.S. at 251 (“In the specific context of 
sex stereotyping, an employer who acts on the basis of a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive, 
or that she must not be, has acted on the basis of gender . . . .”). 
90. 608 F.2d 327, 329 (9th Cir. 1979). 
91. DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 332 (9th Cir. 1979) (citing Blum v. 
Gulf Oil Corp., 597 F.2d 936, 938 (5th Cir. 1979) (per curiam)). 
92. See, e.g., Prowel v. Wise Bus. Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d 285, 291 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing 
Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 228) (noting discrimination under Title VII can be difficult to 
ascertain). 
93. See id. at 287, 291–92 (finding sufficient evidence to warrant a claim for harassment or 
discrimination under Title VII while affirming the district court’s holding that sexual orientation 
discrimination is not cognizable under Title VII); see, e.g., Hively, 853 F.3d at 341 
(“[D]iscrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is a form of sex discrimination.”). 
94. 579 F.3d 285, 291 (3d Cir. 2009). 
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stereotyping evidence when such evidence was linked to or associated 
with sexual orientation.95  In Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, for example, 
the court stated as follows:   
When utilized by an avowedly homosexual plaintiff, however, gender 
stereotyping claims can easily present problems for an adjudicator.  This is 
for the simple reason that ‘[s]tereotypical notions about how men and 
women should behave will often necessarily blur into ideas about 
heterosexuality and homosexuality.’ . . . Like other courts we have 
therefore recognized that a gender stereotyping claim should not be used 
to “bootstrap protection for sexual orientation into Title VII.96 
Notably, this case law on Title VII’s coverage of sexual orientation as 
a whole has been described as a “confused hodge-podge of cases,” and 
“an odd state of affairs”—where, for example, Title VII protects 
effeminate men from employment discrimination but only if they are 
straight and not gay.97 
V.    DISCRIMINATION BECAUSE OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION IS 
NECESSARILY DISCRIMINATION BECAUSE OF SEX—DONALD ZARDA 
In Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., the Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
confronted this confusion head-on: “we are persuaded that the line 
between sex discrimination and sexual orientation discrimination is 
difficult to draw because that line does not exist save as a lingering and 
faulty judicial construct.”98  In Zarda, the Second Circuit, en banc, held 
sexual orientation discrimination is a form or subset of sex discrimination 
under Title VII because an employee’s sex is necessarily a motivating 
factor in sexual orientation discrimination.99  In the case, a gay sky-
diving instructor, Donald Zarda, told a female client while preparing for 
 
95. See Hively, 830 F.3d at 344 (addressing a line of cases applying a categorical rule 
against recognizing sexual orientation as a cognizable Title VII claim); see also Magnusson v. Cty. 
of Suffolk, No. 14CV3449, 2016 WL 2889002, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. May 17, 2016) (describing that 
‘‘[s]exual orientation discrimination is not actionable under Title VII, and plaintiffs may not 
shoehorn what are truly claims of sexual orientation discrimination into Title VII by framing them 
as claims of discrimination based on gender stereotypes, as Plaintiff at times attempts to do here’’). 
96. 398 F. 3d 211, 218 (2d Cir. 2005). 
97. Hively, 830 F.3d at 342–44. 
98. 883 F.3d at 122; see Hively, 853 F.3d at 346 (concluding “the line between a gender 
nonconformity claim and one based on sexual orientation . . . does not exist”). 
99. 883 F.3d at 122. 
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a tandem skydive that he was gay.100   Because of this, the client alleged 
Zarda “inappropriately touched her and disclosed his sexual orientation 
to excuse his behavior.”101  Subsequently, the client told her boyfriend 
who then informed Zarda’s boss.102  Zarda was subsequently fired.103   
Zarda then sued his employer alleging sex discrimination under Title 
VII on the ground that his non-conformity to male sex stereotypes 
resulted in his termination.104  The district court granted summary 
judgment in favor of the employer, concluding that precedent, such as 
Dawson, indicated that Zarda had failed to establish a prima facie case 
under Title VII because a gender stereotype claim cannot be predicated 
on sexual orientation.105  A Second Circuit panel subsequently 
affirmed—declining to revisit binding precedent.106 
Sitting en banc, the Second Circuit reversed the panel’s decision.107  
It provided several rationales in support of its holding that sexual 
orientation discrimination is a form of sex discrimination under Title 
VII.108  First, the court emphasized that sexual orientation, by its nature, 
is sex-dependent:  “[s]exual orientation is doubly delineated by sex 
because it is a function of both a person’s sex and the sex of those to 
whom he or she is attracted.”109  Thus, firing a man, like Zarda, who is 
attracted to men is a decision motivated, at least in part, by sex.110  
“Logically, because sexual orientation is a function of sex and sex is a 
protected characteristic under Title VII, it follows that sexual orientation 
is also protected.”111 
Second, the court utilized a comparative test, asking “whether the 
employee would have been treated differently ‘but for’ his or her sex.”112  
 
100. Id. at 108. 
101. Id. 
102. Id. 
103. Id. at 108–09.   
104. Id. at 107.   
105. Id. at 109.   
106. Id. at 109–10. 
107. Id. at 132. 
108. See generally id. at 111–32 (providing a thorough analysis on why discrimination 
based on an individual’s sexual orientation constitutes sex discrimination under Title VII).   
109. Id. at 113. 
110. Id. at 114. 
111. Id. at 113; see Hively, 853 F.3d at 358 (Flaum, J., concurring) (“One cannot consider 
a person’s homosexuality without also accounting for their sex . . . .”). 
112. Zarda, 883 F.3d at 119. 
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In the context of sexual orientation—a man who is fired because he is 
attracted to men—would not have been fired had he been a woman 
attracted to men.113  Notably, the court rejected the view that the proper 
comparison should hold everything, including sexual orientation, 
constant except sex—for example, an employer that discriminates based 
on sexual orientation treats gay men the same as gay women, showing no 
sex discrimination.114   
Accordingly, the court held that the proper purpose of the comparative 
test is to determine whether a trait, such as sexual orientation, is a proxy 
for sex.115  As such, “[t]he trait [sexual orientation] is the control, sex is 
the independent variable, and employee treatment is the dependent 
variable.”116 
Third, the court applied the reasoning in Price Waterhouse to sexual 
orientation: “we concluded that when . . . [an employer] acts on the basis 
of a belief that [men] cannot be [attracted to men], or that [they] must not 
be,’ but takes no such action against women who are attracted to men, the 
employer ‘has acted on the basis of gender.’”117  The court’s application 
of Price Waterhouse was consistent with the holding in Hively v. Ivy Tech 
Community College—where the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held 
that same-sex orientation represented the “ultimate case of failure to 
conform” to the gender stereotype “that ‘real’ men should date women, 
and not other men.”118  Even where negative views of gay persons are 
rooted in morality, such moral beliefs cannot be disassociated from 
beliefs about sex.119   
Thus, sexual orientation discrimination is sex discrimination under 
Title VII because it implicates Price Waterhouse’s proscription against 
 
113. Id. at 116; see Hively, 853 F.3d at 345 (describing the comparative test as 
“paradigmatic sex discrimination”). 
114. See Zarda, 883 F.3d at 116 (recognizing that changing sex also changes sexual 
orientation—thus showing that sexual orientation is interconnected with sex). 
115. See id. at 116–19 (“To determine whether a trait operates as a proxy for sex, we ask 
whether the employee would have been treated differently ‘but for’ his or her sex.”). 
116. Id. at 117, 119. 
117. See id. at 120–21 (quoting Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250). 
118. See id. at 121 (quoting Hively, 853 F.3d at 346 and Centola v. Potter, 183 F.Supp.2d 
403, 410 (D. Mass. 2002)). 
119. See id. at 122 (“Beliefs about sexual orientation necessarily take sex into consideration 
and, by extension, moral beliefs about sexual orientation are necessarily predicated, in some degree, 
on sex.”). 
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adverse employment actions based on gender stereotypes.120  In Zarda, 
the Second Circuit also rejected the view that sexual orientation 
discrimination “is not barred by Price Waterhouse because it treats 
women no worse than men.”121  Therefore, it follows that the employer 
in Price Waterhouse could not have defended itself by firing both 
effeminate men and masculine women.122 
Finally, the court reasoned that precedent discussing associational 
discrimination supported its holding that sexual orientation 
discrimination violated Title VII.123  In doing so, the court reaffirmed 
that, “[w]here an employee is subjected to adverse action because an 
employer disapproves of interracial association, the employee suffers 
discrimination because of the employee’s own race.”124  For example, 
when a white employee is fired for dating a black person, it constitutes 
racial discrimination.125   
Such a conclusion is true because “the prohibition on associational 
discrimination applies with equal force to all the classes protected by 
Title VII, including sex.”126  Thus, firing a male employee for dating 
another man constitutes sex discrimination.127  “In most contexts, where 
an employer discriminates based on sexual orientation, the employer’s 
decision is predicated on opposition to romantic association between 
 
120. See Hively, 853 F.3d at 346 (“A policy that discriminates on the basis of sexual 
orientation . . . is based on assumptions about the proper behavior for someone of a given sex”); cf. 
Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250–51 (rejecting the notion that “sex stereotyping” lacks legal 
relevance). 
121. See Zarda, 883 F.3d at 123 (“Price Waterhouse . . . stands for the proposition that 
employers may not discriminate against women or men who fail to conform to conventional gender 
norms.”); cf. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251 (“We are beyond the day when an employer could 
evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype associated with their 
group.”). 
122. Zarda, 883 F.3d at 123. 
123. See id. at 124 (acknowledging that associational discrimination extends to all classes 
protected by Title VII). 
124. See id. (quoting Holcomb v. Iona College, 521 F.3d 130, 139 (2d Cir. 2008)). 
125. See e.g., Deffenbaugh–Williams v. Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., 156 F.3d 581, 589 (5th Cir. 
1998) (‘‘A reasonable juror could find that [Plaintiff] was discriminated against because of her race 
(white), if that discrimination was premised on the fact that she, a white person, had a relationship 
with a black person.’’). 
126. Zarda, 883 F.3d at 125. 
127. See id. at 131 (holding that sex discrimination based on a person’s sexual orientation 
is cognizable under Title VII). 
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particular sexes.”128  In Zarda, the Second Circuit blatantly rejected the 
argument that whereas “anti-miscegenation policies are motivated by 
racism, . . . sexual orientation discrimination is not rooted in sexism.”129  
Such an argument was rejected because Title VII is not limited by the 
colloquial concept of “sexism.”130  For example, in Oncale, the court 
held that male-on-male sex harassment—a concept not traditionally seen 
as sexism—violates Title VII.131 
Notably, in Zarda, the Second Circuit rejected arguments against 
interpreting Title VII to include discrimination based on sexual 
orientation.132  Specifically, in the majority opinion, the court rejected 
several arguments raised by the employer and the dissenting judges in 
their opinions regarding Title VII’s interpretation—many of which are 
addressed above.133  The court painstakingly rejected the dissent’s 
principal argument that interpreting Title VII to include sexual 
orientation discrimination “misconceives the fundamental public 
meaning of the language of” Title VII.134  
According to Judge Lynch’s dissent in Zarda, Congress “intended to 
secure the rights of women to equal protection in employment . . . [not] 
to protect an entirely different category of people.”135  Judge Lynch also 
argued that the Supreme Court’s interpretation of Title VII regarding the 
coverage of sex harassment and same-sex harassment “do not say 
anything about whether discrimination based on other social categories 
is covered . . . ”136   However, the majority opinion disagreed with this 
 
128. Id. at 124; see Hively, 853 F.3d at 349 (describing that “to the extent that the statute 
prohibits discrimination on the basis of the race of someone with whom the plaintiff associates, it 
also prohibits discrimination on the basis of . . . the sex of the associate.”). 
129. Zarda, 883 F.3d at 126. 
130. See id. (“But the Court need not resolve this dispute because the amici supporting 
defendants identify no cases indicating that the scope of Title VII’s protection against sex 
discrimination is limited to discrimination motivated by what would colloquially be described as 
sexism”). 
131. See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79 (holding that a claim under Title VII is not barred merely 
because the plaintiff and defendant are of the same sex); see also id. at 127 (stating that Oncale 
represents how male-on-male sexual harassment is not traditionally conceptualized as sexism). 
132. See generally Zarda, 883 F.3d at 115, 126–27 (holding that an employee had a 
cognizable sex discrimination claim because his employer took adverse action against him due to 
his failure to “conform to the straight male macho stereotype”). 
133. Id. 
134. See id. at 137–39. 
135. Id. at 145. 
136. Id. at 147. 
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statement and, relying on Oncale, eschewed reliance on divining 
legislative intent.137  Instead, the court was strictly guided by the lodestar 
of statutory interpretation—the actual text of Title VII.138  The court 
viewed sexual orientation discrimination as a “reasonably comparable 
evil” to sexual harassment and male-on-male harassment, which the 
Supreme Court has held is plainly covered by the text of Title VII.139 
VI.    SEXUAL ORIENTATION DISCRIMINATION IS NOT PROHIBITED BY 
TITLE VII BASED ON 39-YEAR-OLD PRECEDENT—GERALD BOSTOCK 
In Bostock, the Eleventh Circuit issued a two-page per curiam opinion 
and held that discrimination because of sexual orientation “is not 
prohibited by Title VII.”140  There, a gay man, Gerald Bostock, worked 
as a child welfare services coordinator for Clayton County.141  He 
performed exceedingly well at his job, earning the program multiple 
accolades.142  After Bostock joined a gay recreational softball league, he 
was subjected to disparaging comments about his sexual orientation and 
later fired.143  Bostock sued alleging discrimination based on his sexual 
orientation under Title VII.144  The district court dismissed his claim, 
citing Blum as binding precedent.145  Subsequently, the Eleventh Circuit 
affirmed the dismissal of Bostock’s claim and denied a rehearing.146 
VII.    PERSONAL OBSERVATIONS AND PERSPECTIVES 
A. The Court’s Legitimacy and the Credibility of Textualism 
Justice Neil M. Gorsuch’s questions to counsel during Supreme Court 
oral arguments received considerable press coverage over speculation 
that his vote might be in play in favor of lesbian, gay, bisexual and 
 
137. Id. at 115. 
138. Id. 
139. Id. at 132 (quoting Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79). 





145. Id.; see Blum, 597 F.2d at 936 (holding that the employer had a legitimate reason for 
discharge—even if a prima facie case of sex discrimination was presented).   
146. Bostock, 723 F. App’x at 964, 965. 
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transgender workers.147   Specifically, Justice Gorsuch, asked Stephens’ 
counsel the following: 
When a case is really close, really close, on the textual 
evidence, . . . assume for the moment . . . I’m with you on the textual 
evidence . . . .  At the end of the day, should he or she take into 
consideration the massive social upheaval that would be entailed in such a 
decision, and the possibility that . . . Congress didn’t think about it . . . and 
that . . . it is . . . more appropriate a legislative rather than a judicial 
function?148 
Earlier in his questioning to Stephens’ counsel, Justice Gorsuch also 
asked the following: 
I’d just like you to have a chance to respond to Judge Lynch in his 
thoughtful dissent in which he lamented everything you have before us, but 
suggested that something as drastic a change in this country as bathrooms 
in every place of employment and dress codes in every place of 
employment that are otherwise gender neutral would be changed, . . . that’s 
an essentially legislative decision . . . .  It’s a question of judicial 
modesty.149 
In response, counsel argued that (1) the 20-year-old appellate court’s 
recognition of transgender-based discrimination as sex discrimination has 
not put an end to sex-specific dress codes and restrooms, and (2) Stephens 
was requesting the Court to interpret Title VII’s text as written and not 
address a policy question more appropriate for Congress.150  Justice 
Gorsuch, however, appeared unsatisfied with this answer when he asked, 
“[d]id you want to address Judge Lynch’s argument or not?”151 
When read in context, Justice Gorsuch’s statement about textual 
evidence being close appears inconsistent with his focus on Judge 
Lynch’s dissent, which clearly rejected the textualism analysis, 
 
147. Adam Liptak & Jeremy W. Peters, Supreme Court Considers Whether Civil Rights Act 
Protects L.G.B.T. Workers, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/08/us/ 
politics/supreme-court-gay-transgender.html [https://perma.cc/DR5W-HZEH]. 
148. Transcript of Oral Argument at 26–27, R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc. v. 
EEOC, 2019 WL 5087134 (2019) [Hereinafter Harris Funeral Home Transcript]. 
149. See id. (referencing Judge Lynch’s dissenting opinion in Zarda concerning the 
appropriateness of judicial action in altering the meaning of Title VII in a way Congress did not 
anticipate). 
150. Id. at 27–28. 
151. Id. at 28. 
21
Juarez: A Textuary Ray of Hope for LGBTQ+ Workers
Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2020
  
214 THE SCHOLAR [Vol. 22:193 
describing it as “hyperliteral.”152   In Judge Lynch’s view, reading Title 
VII to encompass sexual orientation would not be an application of Title 
VII’s text, but an amendment to Title VII—a task more appropriate for 
the legislature.153  Despite Justice Gorsuch’s statement about textual 
evidence being close, his focus on Judge Lynch’s dissent could indicate 
his inclination to outright reject the textualism analysis.154 
A Supreme Court decision rejecting textual coverage but calling it 
close will justifiably substantiate criticism about the undue influence of 
ideological bias in the Court’s decisions.155  Similarly, such a decision 
will also add credible evidence to bolster the criticism that textualism, as 
a method of statutory interpretation, is not neutral—but in crucial respects 
is subject to sham.156  The arguments for textual coverage are strong and 
straightforward.157  Justice Gorsuch and Justice John Roberts, as 
conservatives, presumably would wish to shore up the legitimacy of the 
Court, as well as the credibility of textualism.158  One of them will likely 
provide the swing vote (joining the four liberal Justices), which 
represents the best hope for an opinion to hold that coverage under Title 
VII’s plain text is clear.159 
During oral arguments, Justice Gorsuch also presented the issue of 
whether the Court—where statutory coverage is a close call—should 
 
152. Id. at 26–27; cf. Zarda, 883 F.3d at 144 n.7 (quoting Justice Antonin Scalia, “[a]dhering 
to the fair meaning of the text . . . does not limit one to the hyperliteral meaning of each text.”). 
153. See Zarda, 883 F.3d at 165 (relying on the legislature to enact details for broad 
statutes). 
154. See Harris Funeral Home Transcript, supra note 148 (recognizing the presence of 
textual evidence, and stating that this case is not about “extra-textual stuff”).   
155. Cf. id. (rejecting a textualism approach and instead directing the Court towards the 
“massive social upheaval that would be entailed in such a decision”).   
156. See William Eskridge, Symposium:  Textualism’s Moment of Truth, SCOTUS BLOG 
(Sept. 4, 2019, 2:30 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2019/09/symposium-textualisms-moment-
of-truth/ [https://perma.cc/L43W-GGJH] (emphasizing the importance of theories such as 
textualism to be used equally and in the same manner across the cases in order for theories to be 
considered “neutral”).   
157. See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 78–79 (describing Justice Scalia’s rationale in applying strict 
textualism to a Title VII dispute resulting in an opinion supporting a more liberal social policy). 
158. See Eskridge, supra note 156 (“The credibility of textualism as a neutral methodology 
depends on the court’s deciding cases like Bostock’s without regard to partisan biases”); see also 
Transcript of Oral Argument at 59, Bostock v. Clayton Cty., 139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019) (No. 17-1618) 
[Hereinafter Bostock Transcript] (demonstrating how a majority of Justice Gorsuch’s questioning 
revolved around the text).   
159. See Harris Funeral Home Transcript, supra note 148 (providing Justice Gorsuch’s 
statements agreeing that the textual evidence is close). 
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consider “the massive social upheaval” caused by its decision.160  Justice 
Gorsuch appeared to suggest that when the textual analysis is close and 
the Court’s decision would entail profound social change, the Court 
should, out of judicial modesty, decide against coverage and declare the 
task to be legislative.161  This approach, however, raises unwieldy 
questions for textualism as an interpretative methodology.162   
First, how will the Court determine whether textual coverage is a close 
call?163  During oral argument, for example, Justice Elena Kagan 
described the textual analysis as “firmly” in favor of coverage, whereas 
Justice Gorsuch called it “close.”164  Second, how will the Court 
determine whether its decision would entail “massive social 
upheaval?”165  As Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg pointed out during 
arguments, “[n]o one ever thought sexual harassment was encompassed 
by discrimination on the basis of sex in [1964].”166   
The Supreme Court’s decision in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. 
Vinson—holding that sexual harassment is discrimination because of sex 
under Title VII—undoubtedly entailed profound social change, 
particularly when viewed from the perspective of the mores of 1964.167  
Indeed, the “social upheaval” of the Meritor decision continues to 
reverberate today.168  Justice Gorsuch’s suggested approach could call 
even the Meritor decision into question.169 
 
160. Id. at 26. 
161. Id. at 26–27. 
162. See Eskridge, supra note 156 (explaining that the Supreme Court’s legitimacy rests 
upon a perception that its members are applying existing law in a neutral manner). 
163. See Harris Funeral Home Transcript, supra note 148 (discussing a hypothetical where 
Justice Gorsuch assumes the textual evidence is very close without describing the methodology to 
arrive at that conclusion). 
164. Compare Bostock Transcript, supra note 158 (“[T]he text of the statute appears to  
be firmly in Ms. Karlan’s corner”), with Harris Funeral Home Transcript, supra note 148  
(“[The textual evidence] is close.”). 
165. See, e.g., Harris Funeral Home Transcript, supra note 148 (discussing the change in 
views on sex discrimination’s relation to sexual harassment from 1964 to today). 
166. Id. at 58. 
167. 477 U.S. 57, 73 (1986). 
168. See, e.g., Rafia Zakaria, The Legal System Needs to Catch Up With the #MeToo 
Movement, NATION (Apr. 18, 2018), https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/the-legal-system-
needs-to-catch-up-with-the-metoo-movement/ [https://perma.cc/ZL97-R6GV] (demonstrating 
how Meritor’s decision continues to influence the United States today). 
169. See Harris Funeral Home Transcript, supra note 148 at 58 (cautioning the Court on 
the implications of its decision causing social upheaval).   
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Moreover, although Justice Gorsuch and oral arguments in general 
focused on the purported demise of sex-specific bathrooms and dress 
codes as the “social upheaval” caused by a decision favoring coverage; 
should the Court also consider the profound social harms implicated by a 
court decision against coverage?170  In other words, should the Court 
shake off its judicial modesty and make the close call for textual coverage 
because the harms would otherwise be devastating?171  Justice Sonia 
Sotomayor raised this point when she asked the question of when the 
Court should step in to address invidious discrimination against lesbian, 
gay, bisexual, and transgender persons where—in her view—such 
discrimination fit the statutory words.172  A decision by the Court for 
coverage would address invidious workplace discrimination and clearly 
promote Title VII’s statutory purpose. 
B. Opportunities Seized and Lost   
One of the most important ways to dismantle discrimination at its roots 
is through an effective public education campaign.173  Considering the 
national conversation about the lack of federal nondiscrimination 
protections for LGBTQ+ workers, the Supreme Court’s decision to hear 
these three cases provides a valuable educational opportunity about this 
topic.174  The media coverage about these cases has served to further 
 
170. See, e.g., id. at 60–61 (describing the consequences of decisions which would in turn 
then cause the social upheaval).   
171. See, e.g., id. (asking when the Court should step in when it comes to addressing 
discrimination against LGBTQ+ individuals when the discrimination falls within the relevant 
statute). 
172. See id. (“. . . may I just ask, at what point does a court continue to permit invidious 
discrimination against groups that, where we have a difference of opinion, we believe the language 
of the statute is clear.”); see also Brief of William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Andrew M. Koppelman as 
Amici Curiae in Support of Emps. at 2, Bostock v. Clayton Cty., 139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019) (Nos. 17-
1618, 17-1623, 18-107), 2019 WL 2915046 at 2 [Hereinafter Eskridge & Koppelman Amici Curiae] 
(arguing that where textual coverage is ambiguous, the “Court should consider the statutory plan 
or purpose,” and “Title VII’s stated purpose is to purge the workplace of criteria that Congress 
found unrelated to an employee’s ‘ability or inability to work’”). 
173. See, e.g., U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, STRATEGIC PLAN FOR  
FISCAL YEARS 2018–2022 (2018), https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/plan/strategic_plan_18-22.cfm 
[https://perma.cc/Y5NM-M5SE] (outlining a plan to prevent employment discrimination through 
education and outreach in order to aid citizens in understanding employment discrimination). 
174. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Can Someone be Fired for Being Gay?  The Supreme Court 
Will Decide, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 23, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/23/us/politics/ 
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educate the American public about the humanity of lesbian, gay, bisexual 
and transgender people, and the role of the Supreme Court in addressing 
the need for nondiscrimination protections.175 
However, Supreme Court oral arguments in Aimee Stephens’ case, in 
important respects, missed a historic opportunity to provide a platform 
for correctly educating the public about what it means to be 
transgender.176  A transgender person’s inherent and deeply held sense 
of their gender is their authentic identity.177  That gender identity is 
deeply felt and inherently sensed—a core aspect of personhood.178  It 
means a “transgender woman is a woman” and a “transgender man is a 
man.”179  A crucial part of representing transgender persons in 
discrimination cases is to clearly and consistently present the authenticity 
of their transgender identity and counter arguments that deny or diminish 
such.180 
 
supreme-court-fired-gay.html [https://perma.cc/8YV4-6MEL] (“In more than half the states, 
someone can still be fired for being gay.”).   
175. See, e.g., Because of Sex, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2019/11/07/podcasts/the-daily/transgender-supreme-court.html [https://perma.cc/HA7R-D4Y3] 
(humanizing the transgender issue by sharing a deeply personal experience); Roger Parloff, Three 
LGBTQ Cases Are Set to Put the Supreme Court’s Conservative Principles on Trial, NEWSWEEK 
(Sept. 24, 2019, 9:53 AM), https://www.newsweek.com/2019/10/04/supreme-court-scalia-lgbtq-
rights-title-vii-1460838.html [https://perma.cc/ZGJ5-3F9X] (balancing the roles partisan ideology 
and impartial interpretation play in Supreme Court decisions—especially for LGBTQ+ issues). 
176. See Harris Funeral Home Transcript, supra note 148 at 64 (framing the issue as 
Stephens’ being discharged for appearing “insufficiently masculine” instead of clarifying that 
Stephens is a woman). 
177. See Brief of AMA, Am. Coll. of Physicians & 14 Additional Med., Mental Health & 
Health Care Org. as Amici Curiae in Support of Emps. at 4–5, Bostock v. Clayton Cty., 139 S. Ct. 
1599 (2019) (Nos. 17-1618, 17-1623, 18-107), 2019 WL 3003459 at 4–5 [Hereinafter AMA et al., 
Amici Curiae] (“[T]ransgender individuals have a ‘gender identity’—a ‘deeply felt, inherent sense’ 
of their gender—that is not aligned with the sex assigned to them at birth.”). 
178. Cf. id. at 5 (citing more than four dozen studies demonstrating the consensus among 
health care professionals regarding what it means to be transgender).   
179. Id.   
180. See Alexander Chen, The Supreme Court Doesn’t Understand Transgender  
People, SLATE  (Oct. 18, 2019, 3:11 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2019/10/supreme-
court-transgender-discrimination-sex.html [https://perma.cc/GZ45-7Q5A] (describing that the 
presentation of transgender discrimination cases must “embrac[e] the reality of transgender 
identity, which includes the reality that transgender people thrive when they are permitted to live 
authentically as the men and women that they are.”); see also Paisley Currah, The Aimee Stephens 
Case:  On the Problem with Describing a Trans Woman as an “Insufficiently Masculine” 
Biological Male (Oct. 15, 2019), https://paisleycurrah.com/2019/10/15/the-aimee-stephens-case-
on-the-problem-with-describing-a-trans-woman-as-an-insufficiently-masculine-biological-male/ 
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Unfortunately, Stephens’ counsel argued that she was fired for being 
“insufficiently masculine,” as opposed to arguing she was in fact, a 
transgender woman.”181  Justice Roberts, for example, suggested that a 
transgender employee claiming denial of bathroom access consistent with 
their gender identity would suffer no injury based on biological sex, but 
would be injured when the claim is analyzed in terms of transgender 
status.182  An alternatively framed argument, such as consistently 
referring to Stephens as a transgender woman who was fired because she 
did not meet the gender stereotype that all women are assigned the sex 
female at birth, would have better reflected the reality that Stephens is a 
woman.183  Such a framing would also have facilitated arguing that as a 
transgender woman Stephens must be permitted to use the women’s 
bathroom.184 
C. Perseverance 
I often advise prospective law school students that a primary quality 
for success in law school and in a law career is perseverance.  These three 
Supreme Court cases showcase decades of persevering hard work by 
countless advocates for LGBTQ+ workplace equality.185  Indeed, 
advocacy through strategic litigation is a long road filled with difficulties, 
 
[https://perma.cc/SR8Q-MUAJ] (emphasizing the importance in Title VII cases of consistently 
referring to a plaintiff who is a transgender woman as female and “to frame the plaintiff in clear 
and consistent terms that correspond to their actual lived identity and experience”). 
181. See Harris Funeral Home Transcript, supra note 148 at 64 (miseducating what it 
means to be transgender while presenting significant drawbacks to their legal strategy); see also 
Chen, supra note 180 (highlighting the drawbacks of framing Stephens as an insufficiently 
masculine male by failing “to explain why she must be able to live and work as a woman, including 
when using the restroom or dressing for work”). 
182. See Harris Funeral Home Transcript, supra note 148 at 8–14 (comparing the analysis 
of the bathroom case on the basis of biological sex with the analysis in terms of transgender status). 
183. See Chen, supra note 180 (recognizing the inconsistency between arguing Stephens is 
a biological man and arguing she should be permitted to use the women’s restroom). 
184. See Lusardi v. McHugh, No. 0120133395, 2015 WL 1607756 (EEOC Apr. 1, 2015) 
(holding a federal agency discriminated based on sex by denying a transgender employee equal 
access to a common restroom used by other employees of the same gender identity regardless of 
the negative reactions of other employees). 
185. See Bostock, 723 F. App’x at 964–65 (11th Cir. 2018) (affirming the lower court’s 
dismissal of Bostock’s sex discrimination complaint); see also R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, 
Inc., 884 F.3d at 572, 574 (finding discrimination against an employee for failing to conform to the 
dress code of her perceived gender); Zarda, 883 F.3d at 112–13 (recognizing that discrimination 
against one’s sexual orientation falls under the broader umbrella of “sex discrimination”). 
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failures, opposition, opportunities, and successes.186  We are at a pivotal 
and historic juncture in the American LGBTQ+ civil rights 
movement.187  The Supreme Court’s decisions in these cases could 
present major and devastating setbacks, surprising and sweeping wins, or 
muddled and confused compromises. Whatever the outcome, LGBTQ+ 
legal advocates will continue to have their work cut out for them.188  For 
example, the oral arguments showed an utmost need to continue 
educating ourselves, the judiciary, and the community at large about the 
shared humanity and authenticity of transgender people.189  The focus 
must be to steadfastly continue strategic, prudential, and multifaceted 
action to achieve LGBTQ+ workplace equality and justice 
nationwide.190 
 
186. Cf. Parloff, supra note 175 (signifying the conflict between the Supreme Court creating 
precedent by relying on legal principles or by relying on the Court’s political biases).   
187. See generally id. (emphasizing the major consequences that recent Title VII litigation 
will have on workplace discrimination for the LGBTQ+ community). 
188. See Yuki Noguchi, Sexual Harassment Cases Often Rejected by Courts, NPR, 
https://www.npr.org/2017/11/28/565743374/sexual-harassment-cases-often-rejected-by-courts 
(Nov. 28, 2017) [https://perma.cc/F7P2-XXD7] (describing the recent increase in sexual 
harassment claims, but also the increase in dismissals of such cases); see also Meritor Sav. Bank v. 
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (holding that sexual harassment constitutes sex discrimination). 
189.  See, e.g., Harris Funeral Home Transcript, supra note 148  at 8–14 (demonstrating a 
lack of understanding of what it means to be transgender and lack of education on the rights of 
transgender individuals).   
190. See generally U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, supra note 173 (advocating 
to prevent and remedy unlawful employment discrimination and to advance equality of opportunity 
in the workplace). 
27
Juarez: A Textuary Ray of Hope for LGBTQ+ Workers
Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2020
